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favourable audit reports they obtain, the better both the managerial 
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The ongoing debate on corporate governance and codes of good practices or 
corporate governance codes (hereafter, CGC) has been shown to be crucial in 
the current study of the economics of firms. Both academics and professionals 
agree on the need for improving corporate governance by better protecting 
minority shareholders and increasing firms’ transparency and reliance. In this 
sense, regulation issues affect the evolution of the firm more than ever, since the 
voluntary publication of information on corporate governance practices has not 
succeeded in many countries. In fact, the collapses of Enron, Parmalat, Royal 
Ahold and Polly Peck made it clear that firms should undergo further 
modifications to survive and protect their shareholders’ interests. Moreover, the 
situation has worsened since the traditional managerial model based on family 
businesses is rapidly changing towards a concept of a firm more accessible to 
investors of all kinds. Among the proposed modifications, we may highlight 
change in the pattern of ownership structure (non-executive officers, 
institutional investors,..), portfolio diversification, but also improvement in the 
flexibility of adaptation to global markets and an increase in institutional 
investment in international markets as well as the evolution of new technologies 
which enable a faster dissemination of innovation. In this scenario, Mallin, 
Mullineux and Wihlborg (2005) consider that only through codes of good 
practice is it possible to increase confidence in managers, which, in conjunction 
with a favourable economic panorama, creates a very attractive atmosphere for 
shareholders.  
Some of these modifications are contained in the spirit of most of the CGC 
which in the last instance are to encourage public firms -where shareholders 
delegate the management of the firm to the hands of external managers (Matos 
and Coelho, 2003)- to provide more information on the “ethics” of the business 
and the transparency of the management. But obviously the next step was to 
check that the fulfilment of the CGC recommendations effectively enhances 
both shareholder value and social utility. The current paper advances in this 
field, by investigating how the CGC recommendations and several firm 
characteristics related to corporate governance affect a firm’s value, as measured 
by the Tobin’s q ratio.  
On the other hand, previous studies have also cast doubts on the effectiveness of 
the application of CGC in European countries, since sometimes they provoke 
new inefficiencies owing to the lack of suitability of Anglo-Saxon orientated 
codes to Continental-European firms. In most cases, the inefficiencies come 
from the fact that regulatory mechanisms such as the CGC are not required in 
every single firm structure, but only in those ones where the agent-owner 




conflict is patent. Neither family businesses nor a large proportion of small 
businesses will profit from these kinds of practices. Furthermore, since artificial 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as CGC, are not usually compulsory, 
they do not always work properly. For this reason, we chose a Continental-
European country with a Anglo-Saxon orientated CGC, such as Spain, and 
analyse which of the recommendations proposed in the Spanish CGC, the 
Olivencia Code, have positive effects on the value of the firm. Considering 
which of these recommendations are more Anglo-Saxon orientated and which 
are more suitable for the Spanish firm, we shed more light on the topic. 
Consequently, the current study contributes to the investigation on corporate 
governance by using the panel data methodology to measure the relationship 
between firm value and the degree of compliance with the 23 Olivencia Code 
recommendations as well as other corporate governance related variables 
(auditing, directors’ remuneration and transparency, among others). To proxy 
the degree of compliance with the Olivencia Code, we analyse the good 
governance reports submitted by Spanish firms to the Spanish supervisory stock 
exchange commission (CNMV) from 1999 to 2001. Furthermore, we provide 
new empirical evidence for a European stock market where the existing 
literature is still scarce.  
The results suggest a positive relation between the variables of execution of 
good corporate governance practices and the value of the company. There is also 
evidence that the more transparent the company is and the more favourable audit 
reports they obtain, the better the managerial performance and the firm’s value. 
Among the recommendations, it is found that the most relevant aspects are 
transparency and the quality of the audit report, relationships that are 
corroborated by both multivariate analysis techniques and panel data models.  
The current paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revises the state of the art, 
focusing specifically on the Spanish context. Section 3 describes the data and 
methodology and Section 4 empirically analyses the suitability of the Olivencia 
code for Spanish firms while Section 5 presents the model to be tested. Results 
are shown in Section 6, and Section 7 expounds the main conclusions. 
2. REVISION OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH. 
When in 1992 the Cadbury Report was issued in an attempt to supervise and 
enhance managerial behaviour, it brought to light the need for reducing 
managers discretionality and for turning back to those times and firm structures 
where the protection of the shareholders was assured. The Cadbury Report 
represented the first CGC, and from this pioneer experience, many other 
initiatives followed: France, Holland, Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Portugal, Brazil and the United States are examples of countries that already 
possess corporate governance regulations for listed companies. In all cases, the 




codes are intended to enforce auditors’ and analysts’ independence, as well as to 
control both corporate officers and institutional investors versus minority 
shareholders, trying to harmonise the way of managing firms. Furthermore, they 
work on the improvement of transparency, focusing on aspects such as directors’ 
remuneration, and protection against takeovers, thus increasing the confidence 
of shareholders in the managerial group. 
The first attempt to produce a CGC in Spain generated the Olivencia code, 
issued in February 1998 as an initiative of the CNMV (National Supervisory 
Securities Exchange Commission). It basically contained 23 recommendations 
ranging from the regulation of the board structure to the behaviour of their 
members, which tried to ensure the  minority shareholders’ confidence in the 
firm’s management and its transparency1. However the lack of enforcement of 
this document as well as some weaknesses detected provoked the creation in 
September 2002 of a new commission. As a result, a tighter report, the Aldama 
Code (the current Spanish CGC), was released after January 2003. Seven years 
have passed since February 1998 and yet neither CGC seems to be broadly 
fulfilled by Spanish firms. The CNMV itself and its former presidents have 
remarked that only about 21% of firms fulfil this requirement; moreover, since 
this figure refers to the Olivencia code, it is expected to diminish when referring 
to the Aldama code, although it is still too early to speak of its application. 
Therefore, new voices have arisen demanding the use of CGC as a way of 
promoting responsibility and transparency in corporate governance. Otherwise, 
it would be difficult to ensure investors’ confidence in the stock markets.  
Apart from the efforts on the regulation side, the financial literature has worked 
hard during the last decade to define proper corporate governance mechanisms 
whose effects would noticeably affect firms’ evolution, namely, a firm’s value. 
In this sense, two approaches maybe highlighted: the study of the effects of 
CGC on a firm’s value and the effects on a firm’s value of a long list of factors 
related to control/agency factors, and managerial behaviour, which may 
determine the existence of healthy good corporate governance practices within 
the firm. Since the pioneer work of Berle and Means (1932) on the problems of 
the separation of ownership and control, different studies have focused on the 
relationship between corporate governance and the agency theory. Le Vigoureux 
(1997) analysed the true essence of corporate management and relates it to the 
decrease in the number of family businesses. Jensen (1993) studied corporate 
governance’s mechanisms, while Jensen and Meckling (1976) mainly focused 
on the directors’ participation in the ownership structure. The revision of those 
mechanisms around the different countries was analysed by Roe (1993) and, 
more recently, corporate scandals, such as the collapse of Enron in 2001 and the 
problems suffered by Parmalat in 2003 have once again brought this topic to the 
forefront.  




Thus, new approaches to corporate governance highlight aspects such as the 
protection of minority shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jonhnson, 
Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000) and the increasing participation of 
institutional shareholders (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Barnhart, Marr and 
Rosenstein, 1994) who are able to protect their rights more efficiently than 
individual shareholders. On the other hand, the demands for good corporate 
governance practices are increasing as new aspects of the organization of the 
firm become more relevant: capital sustainability, social corporate 
responsibility, increase in manpower skill and high technology (Rodríguez, 
2003). Furthermore, in the stock market, where the access to information is 
easier and most agents demand better information on corporate governance, new 
conflicts may rise within the firm if the corporate governance is not efficient. 
According to Evans, Evans and Loh (2002), although corporate governance has 
for years been considered an important aspect of corporate control, it has only 
been in recent years that the study has focused on organizational structures and 
their management (Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann, 2003; Lehmann and 
Weigand, 2002; Fernández, Gómez-Ansón and Cuervo, 2004). Among these 
studies we perceive a great diversity in the way the relationships are analysed, 
since research into corporate governance has identified a variety of mechanisms 
that assure that managers act in the shareholders’ best interest. Among those 
mechanisms, the traditional distinction between internal and external 
mechanisms also applies. Among the internal mechanisms we may quote 
ownership concentration and managers’ ownership (Chaganti and Damanpour, 
1991; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Dahya, Lonie and Power, 1998), board 
composition (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Evans, Evans and Loh, 2002; Matos and 
Coelho, 2003), executive remuneration (Mehran, 1995 and Evans, Evans and 
Loh, 2002). Among the external ones, we have the level of debt financing (Kim 
and Stulz, 1988; Safieddine and Titman, 1999; González, 1997) and dividend 
distribution (Jensen, 1986).  
One of the main internal control mechanisms is without trace of doubt, 
ownership concentration. However, its impact on the performance of the 
company has still not been clearly dilucidated. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
demonstrate that ownership concentration increases a firm’s value, however, in 
Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994), this result is inverted due to the large 
shareholders’ risk aversion. Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) do not obtain 
conclusive results on the relationship between ownership concentration and a 
firm’s liquidity. Focusing on other roles of ownership concentration, Moerland 
(1995) insists on the role of ownership structure as the main differentiating 
characteristic among different financial systems.  
An additional internal control mechanism is the composition of the board of 
directors, distinguishing between internal and external directors, as highlighted 




in the embryonic research of Vance (1964) which produces a positive 
correlation between the proportion of internal directors and the measures of a 
firm’s result.  Klein (1998) provides evidence on the positive relationship 
between a firm’s value and the representation of internal directors on the 
investment committee, while in his paper of 2000, he detects a significant 
negative correlation between a firm’s value and the proportion of independent 
directors. Regarding external directors, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) confirm 
the hypothesis that external directors are chosen according to the shareholders’ 
best interests. In turn, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) do not find any significant relationship between the composition of the 
board of directors and several measures of corporate governance. And, finally, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a negative correlation between the proportion 
of external directors and the value of the company, measured by Tobin’s q. 
According to Mayer (1992) or Dahya, Lonie and Power (1998), it is the 
localization of the control rights rather than ownership concentration which 
determines the degree of intervention exercised by a firm’s owners. In fact, 
Pound (1995) describes some of the situations discouraging small shareholders 
from exercising their rights, enabling managers to persist in their mistakes and 
negatively affect the firm’s value. Therefore, many of the abovementioned 
studies have attempted to identify where the effective control is located, trying, 
as we do, to clarify how all these variables affect a firm’s value. 
The variety of papers increases when analysing corporate governance 
mechanisms around the world. In this study we have selected Spain, but many 
other places, apart from the USA and the UK, have also been analysed such as 
Australia (Evans, Evans and Loh, 2002), Germany (Lehann and Weigand, 2000) 
and some emerging markets (Gibson, 2003). For the Spanish case, we should 
first consider which mechanism is a priori deemed the most efficient. For 
instance, prior to Enron’s collapse and the re-birthing of corporate governance 
codes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that German, Japanese and US firms 
would rather have bank control and institutional investors than artificial 
mechanisms, combining the presence of institutional investors with a regulatory 
system that better protects shareholders' rights. On the other hand, Continental 
European had not yet developed a proper corporate governance system, although 
they were mainly based on internal mechanisms such as ownership 
concentration and debt, which, in the last instance, are less effective since they 
lack the necessary legal protection.   
Returning to the need to determine which is the most appropriate CGC for 
Spanish firms, so far there is a lack of empirical studies providing conclusive 
results. However, there is a long list of descriptive studies that have analysed 
different aspects of corporate governance. Navarro-Rubio (1998) analyses 
different corporate governance systems (distinguishing between a market based 
system and an internal mechanisms based system) and the factors that motivate 




higher requirements of effective control, while Fernández and Gómez–Ansón 
(1999) analyse the differences between internal and external corporate 
governance systems. Also Recalde (2003) focuses on the differences detected 
between the Anglo-Saxon pattern and that required by Spanish firms. He 
concludes that the corporate governance requirements for European public firms 
are completely different from those of the US, and that the model of CGC 
should be adapted to each country’s specifications. For instance, when we 
simply analyse ownership structure, while the three largest shareholders 
accumulate 20% of the capital in countries like the United States, in Spain, the 
proportion of widely held non financial firms capital is 25% (Faccio and Lang, 
2002) and, as pointed out by Crespí (1998) the ownership concentration 
threshold is 10%. Spanish firms also differ when considering the percentage of 
independent directors, which for 2001 was only approximately 33% (the ratio 
raises to 37% for firms quoting in the Spanish index –Ibex35). 
However, there is a constant in every code, regardless of other differences 
among countries: the control mechanisms, either internal or external, used in the 
majority of the countries are the same. Fernández, Gomez-Ansón and Fernández 
(1998) focus on these common aspects, analysing the influence on a firm’s value 
of the composition and size of the board of directors, and the directors’ 
ownership participation. Other aspects of corporate governance which have been 
also analysed for the Spanish context are the role of directors’ remuneration 
(Ortín and Salas, 1997), ownership structure (Galve and Salas, 1993; Galve and 
Salas, 1996), and the positive aspects of the improvement in transparency and 
the fulfilling of good governance practices in Spanish firms (Olcese, Gascó, 
Martínez-Pardo, Bonet and Gómez-Ansón, 2004). However, as mentioned 
above, not many firms comply with these practices, and at first, it seems that the 
compliance with the code did not provoke an increase in the firm’s ROI, 
although Fernández, Gómez-Ansón and Cuervo (2004) detected a positive 
market reaction to firms’ announcements of their compliance with the Olivencia 
code when they involve a re-structuring of the board of directors; for partial 
compliance, the market only reacts positively for lower levered firms and firms 
with a high proportion of executive directors. Fernández y Gómez-Ansón (2003) 
work in the construction of a ratio of good corporate performance which also 
include the compliance with the Olivencia code, but non conclusive results are 
obtained yet, as far as we know. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY. 
The main objective of this paper is mainly to explain how firm´s value is 
affected by a group of variables which capture the effect of good governance 
practices in the Spanish company nowadays. However, the paper goes further in 
the study of the effects of the Olivencia code and its suitability for monitoring 
Spanish firms, in the light of previous criticisms based on the fact that corporate 




governance requirements for Continental European public firms are extremely 
different from those of the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
In this sense, we first analysed the recommendations contained in the Olivencia 
code, which has been classified as an Anglo-Saxon oriented code, and determine 
which of its 22 recommendations are more useful or more suitable to help 
minority shareholders to protect their interests and therefore improve corporate 
governance. Data on compliance with the Olivencia code by Spanish firms were 
obtained from the CNMV, which from 1999 to 2001 sent a questionnaire to all 
Spanish quoted firms demanding information of their compliance with each of 
the 23 recommendations contained in the Olivencia code. The answers to this 
questionnaire were easily obtained from the CNMV website. Since answering 
the questionnaire was voluntary, the degree of response was not high. In fact, for 
the 3 years, we have an initial sample of 145 firms, out of which 61 firms 
quoting in the Spanish continuous market, answer the questionnaire in 1999, 67 
firms in 2000 and 59 companies in 2001. A distribution of firms by sectors is 
shown in Table 1. To determine which of these recommendations were best 
observed by Spanish firms and which affect a firm’s value, multivariate analysis 
techniques were applied, namely discriminant and factor analyses. 
Our second objective consisted of determining the effects of the most relevant 
recommendations, as well as other firm control-related factors, on a firm’s 
value, in order to gauge whether the compliance with corporate governance 
mechanisms has been positive for Spanish firms since the application of the 
Olivencia code in 1998. 
For this purpose, we have considered a period of study comprising two periods:  
a control period where the Olivencia code had not yet been issued (from 1996 to 
1998), and a second period, from 1999 to 2002, years for which there are data 
available on the application of the Olivencia code and the degree of compliance 
with its recommendations. For this second analysis, we constructed a complete 
and balanced panel for 50 non-financial firms ranging from 1996 to 2001. 
Financial firms were dropped from the sample, as well as firms with incomplete 
or unreliable data. Financial data were obtained from the COMPUSTAT 
database.  
We considered different panel data specifications to account for the data 
structure. The model to be tested is given in equation 1, the left hand side 
variable being the Tobin’s q and Xit standing for the vector of either exogenous 
or predetermined variables. 
ititit uXy += β'  TtNi ,...,1y  ,...,1 =∀=∀     (1) 
Under the presence of unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity (ηi) the random 
variable, uit, can be decomposed as shown in equation (2),  




itiitu εη +=   TtNi ,...,1 and ,...,1 =∀=∀     (2) 
where εit is a white noise, thus fulfilling the following properties: 
[ ] 0=itE ε  TtNi ,...,1 and ,...,1 =∀=∀  
 [ ] 22 εσε =itE  TtNi ,...,1 and ,...,1 =∀=∀  
[ ] 0=jsitE εε  TstNji ,...,1, and ,...,1, =∀=∀  such that ji ≠  or . (3) st ≠
The impact of the individual characteristics of the firms on the behaviour of the 
overall model has been traditionally incorporated by two different perspectives 
labelled Fixed Effects and Random Effects models (hereafter FE and RE models, 
respectively). The former is motivated by the need of exploiting the panel data 
structure by controlling unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, which is 
captured by different individual intercepts, ηi. It is well-known that the so-called 
Within-Group (WG) estimator provides consistent estimates for the parameters 
of the model (vector β) – see Arellano (2003) or Baltagi (2005) for further 
details.  
On the other hand, the RE model is based on the possibility of separating out 
permanent from transitory components of data variation, which implies the 
consideration of random variables for the individual components (ηi) that must 
be uncorrelated to the transitory components (εit). Therefore the RE model needs 
the following additional assumptions: 
 [ ] 0=iE η  Ni ,...,1=∀  
 [ ] 22 ηση =iE   ,...,1 Ni =∀  
 [ ] 0=jiE ηη   ,...,1, Nji =∀  such that ji ≠  
 [ ] 0=jtiE εη  TtNji ,...,1 and ,...,1, =∀=∀ .    (4) 
Even under such conditions, the disturbances of the resulting RE model are, 
however, serially correlated since [ ] 02 ≠= ησisituuE  for all  and, 
consequently, the OLS estimates are not efficient. Hence, the (Feasible) GLS 
must be used taking into account the variance and covariance matrix of the RE 
model disturbances vector. This methodology yields more efficient estimates but 
it requires a further assumption, since the regressors and the specific firm 
component must be uncorrelated, i.e. 
st ≠
[ ] 0=iitxE η  Ni ,...,1=∀ . Otherwise, the 
consistency of the GLS estimator could be jeopardised and thus the WG 
estimator would be preferable since, despite not being efficient, it is always 
consistent. According to these ideas, Hausman’s (1978) specification test may 
be used to compare a FE model versus a RE model. Under the null hypothesis of 
individual effects uncorrelated to the regressors, both estimators are consistent 
but, in terms of efficiency, the RE should be chosen. Alternatively, Breusch and 
Pagan’s (1979) LR test for random effects can be also used.  




The discussion on FE and RE models, however, is only valid in static models 
where all regressors are strictly exogenous. Nevertheless in many cases the 
specification of dynamic structures strongly recommended (e.g. to avoid 
possible autocorrelation or endogeneity problems), not even the WG is 
consistent. Moreover, calculating first differences to remove ηi component 
creates a negative correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
errors in the transformed equation. In that case, the first differenced equation 
could be estimated by instrumental variables (IV) or two-step-least squares 
(2SLS), since the lagged levels of the dependent variable, dated t−s for s larger 
than the maximum lag of the dynamic structure of the model, are valid 
instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) derived a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) by optimally exploiting the moment conditions. This 
methodology assumes that there is no autocorrelation in εit, which must also be 
tested (m1 and m2 statistics for first and second order autocorrelation in the first 
difference residuals). Moreover the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
for the dynamic panel data model must also be implemented to check the 
validity of the instruments. 
4. THE SUITABILITY OF THE OLIVENCIA CODE FOR SPANISH 
FIRMS. 
To determine the suitability of the Olivencia code, we analyse the degree of 
compliance with each recommendation in the Olivencia code and its explanatory 
power with regard to a firm’s value. With this purpose we performed a 
discriminant analysis in order to determine the effects on a firm’s value of each 
individual recommendation as well as their clustering. The dependent variable is 
a firm’s value, proxied through the Tobin’Q which we defined, following 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) as shown in equation (5). As usually, Q values 




__' +=        (5) 
As independent variables, we use each of the first 22 recommendations of the 
Olivencia code2. To construct these variables, for each company answering the 
CNMV’s questionnaire in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, we assigned a value 
of 0, 1 or 2 to each recommendation, considering whether the firm has total 
compliance (2), partial compliance (1) or non compliance (0) with each 
recommendation. Therefore, a firm which totally complies with the 22 
recommendations would obtain a maximum value of 44; while a firm which 
does not comply at all with any recommendation will take the value of 0. The 
distribution of firms by their level of compliance is plotted in Figure 1. 
Similarly, the sum of the weights obtained by each recommendation for the 




whole group of firms is shown in Table 2, which also provides a hierarchical list 
of the most observed recommendations (column 2).  
Prior to the discriminant analysis, we first performed a factor analysis in order to 
know which aggregation of the 22 recommendations could increase the 
significance of the model. Therefore, we considered the score attributed to each 
of the 22 recommendations from the 191 companies that answered the 
questionnaire from 1999 to 2001. Results were not very conclusive, since the 
only data aggregation obtained by SPSS explained a cumulated total variance of 
only 51%, as shown in Table 3. The aggregation consists of the following four 
factors: Factor 1 comprises recommendations 1 (board of director –BD- 
supervisory function), 5 (Reduction of concentrating power), 6 (BD Secretary ), 
7 (BD and Executive Committee transparency), 8 (Control Sub-Committees), 12 
(BD Resigning Obligations), 13 (Directors age limit ), 14 (Information request 
rights), 16 (Company's internal regulations), 17 (Major shareholders loyalty) and 
20 (Audit Committee role). Factor 2 comprises recommendations 3 (Majority of 
non-executive directors), 4 (BD size), 9 (Information timing), 10 (BD 
efficiency) and 21 (external auditors independence); Factor 3 comprises 
recommendation 2 (Independent directors) and 18 (Transparency) and, finally, 
Factor 4 is formed by the set of recommendations 11 (BD re-election), 15 
(Director remuneration policy), 19 (further auditing requirements) and 22 
(Unqualified audit report). 
Regarding the discriminant analysis, the results shown in Table 4 provide 
evidence of a significant relationship between a firm’s value and 
recommendations 19, 20, 6, 5 and 16,  which are mainly related to further 
auditing requirements, director remuneration policy and internal company 
regulations. For the validation of our results, Table 4 also displays the summary 
of the discriminant canonical functions, with a value of the canonical correlation 
of 0.522. We also display the Wilks’ Lambda test, which measures the statistical 
significance of the discriminatory capacity of the function and which is 
significant in our study.  
It is noteworthy that other significant recommendations, such as 5 and 16, are 
not among those most complied with by Spanish firms, which indicates the need 
for encouraging their compliance. However, there are also some 
recommendations which do not seem to be so determinant for a firm’s welfare 
since they neither affect firm value nor do they seem to be well compliance with 
by Spanish firms (i.e., recommendations 7, 8 and 13, which have to do with a 
firm’s control committee and the director’s age limit). We may thus conclude 
that the Olivencia code also includes aspects which are not so suitable for 
Spanish firms. We thus recall Recalde-Castells (2003) when he indicates that 
European CGCs need to become more normative if they want to be more 
efficient.  




In our point of view, Spanish companies still need to improve in the adoption of 
practices that attempt to enhance good practices in corporate governance.  
5. EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 
OLIVENCIA CODE ON A FIRM’S VALUE. 
This section summarises the hypotheses tested and the variables used for that 
purposes. Although the main objective of the paper consist on measuring the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on managerial value, other 
interesting hypotheses, such as the effects of audit reports, a firm’s transparency 
policy, directors’ remuneration or a firm’ size are also analysed.   
HYPOTHESIS ONE: The greater the compliance with the CGC 
recommendations, the higher a firm’s value.   
According to Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2003), a direct 
relationship is expected between compliance with the CGC and a firm’s value. 
The justification lies in the fact that investors do appreciate the reporting of 
information on compliance with a code that is requiring further corporate social 
responsibility. For this reason, we created a binary variable, GOV, which takes 
the value of 1 for firms that have answered the aforementioned questionnaire 
sent by the CNMV to Spanish firms, and 0 otherwise. Since the execution of 
CGC recommendations is not possible prior to 1999 (the code did not even 
exist), GOV also controls for the period of application (taking the value of 0 for 
years prior to 1999). 
Authors such as Fernández, Gómez-Ansón and Cuervo (2004) have already 
analysed the market reaction to the announcement of compliance, finding 
positive results. However, we want to go further and analyse not only whether 
firms comply or not with the code, but also to what degree a firm is complying 
with the code. For this purpose, a qualitative variable, APLI was constructed as 
the sum of the weights attributed to each of the 22 recommendations for each 
firm and for each year in the sample. Since the attached weights range from 0 
(for non-compliance) to 2 (for total compliance), the value which the variable 
APLI may take ranges from 0 to 44. We then constructed the interactive variable 
APLICGC (APLI*GOV) to better control for any possible change either in the 
intercept or the slope of the function. 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: The more favourable the audit report, the higher a firm’s 
value. 
Dewing and Russel (2004) analyse the relationship of the audit report with the 
corporate governance regulation, pointing out that many cases of bad 
governance behaviour are related to unfavourable audit reports and lack of 
reliability of financial statements. Therefore, a clean audit report is expected to 




denote a higher firm value. To proxy the quality of the audit report, we followed 
the COMPUSTAD classification that distinguishes 5 categories of audit reports: 
(0) unaudited, (1) unqualified, (2) qualified, (3) no opinion and (4) unqualified 
opinion but explanatory language has been added to the standard report. We thus 
construct a binary variable AUDI that takes value 1 for categories 1 and 4, and 0 
otherwise.  
HYPOTHESIS THREE: The greater the transparency, the higher a firm’s value. 
Following Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2003), a positive relationship 
is expected between transparency and a firm’s value, because shareholders’ 
confidence in managers increases along with the volume and quality of the 
available corporate information. The reason is that managers’ discretionality 
diminishes when they are controlled by adequately informed investors. Since the 
recommendations of the CGC reinforced the improvement of transparency by 
recommending firms to report directors’ remuneration, we thus constructed a 
dummy variable, TRANS, that takes value one for the firms that disclose 
directors’ remuneration and 0 otherwise.    
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: The higher the directors’ compensation, the higher a 
firm’s value.   
 Despite the big controversy regarding the agency theory and the quite 
common opportunistic behaviour on the part of firms directors (Evans, Evans 
and Loh, 2002), there exists evidence on the positive relationship between total 
shareholder returns and directors’ goodwill, as denoted by Conyon, Peck and 
Sadler (2000). Therefore, we intend to test whether managers’ compensation is 
not only a mechanism to ensure a firm’s performance but also to ensure the 
effectiveness of managers behaviour by means of a good remuneration. In this 
sense, a higher compensation will bring better governance and consequently 
better results for a firm’s shareholders (Ooghe and De Langhe, 2002). To proxy 
directors’ compensation we considered the magnitud of their remuneration 
standarised by the volume of the firm’s income. We thus constructed the 
variable REMDIR, which stands for the ratio of directors’ emoluments to pretax 
income, where directors’ emoluments comprise all fixed and variable 
remunerations paid to and on behalf of directors, as measured by Compustat 
item G419, and pretax income (Compustat item G635) represents net operating 
and non-operating income reported before appropriations to untaxed reserves, 
income taxes, minority interest and net and extraordinary items. 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: The bigger the firm, the smaller a firm’s value. 




A negative relationship is expected between firm size and its value due to the 
fact that directors of big firms not only pursue increasing the firm’s value but 
also preserving their status and stability within the firm. According to Drobetz, 
Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2003) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000), the 
negative relationship between firm size and Tobin’s q corroborates that, among 
the biggest firms, the smallest ones are those which care most for the 
shareholder and thus obtain better results than those firms whose directors’ 
targets go beyond shareholders’ satisfaction.  To measure firm size we used the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat item G107). 
In order to test these hypotheses above, we proposed two different specifications 
(eqs. 6 and 7) of the panel data model described in Section 2 (see eqs. 1 to 4). 
The first model represents a static relation while the second one incorporates a 
simple dynamic structure to avoid for possible autocorrelation in the error term. 
ititititititit uLSIZEREMDIRTRANSAUDIAPLICGCGOVQ +++++++= 6543210 βββββββ  (6) 
itititititititit uLSIZEREMDIRTRANSAUDIAPLICGCGOVQQ ++++++++= − 765432110 ββββββββ  (7) 
where is a proxy for a firm’s value, as shown in equation 5 above, and the 
independent variables follow the description shown in Table 5. 
itQ
The subindex refers to the observations for each variable of company i in 
moment t, βj represents the coefficients associated with each variable and uit is 
the error term.  
6. RESULTS 
Table 6 displays the estimates and their corresponding t-statistics for the 
different panel data models. The linear restrictions test (F49,292) confirms the 
need of exploiting the panel data structure to avoid cross-sectional heterogeneity 
biases. The first and second columns correspond to the static FE and RE models. 
According to the Hausman specification test and the Breusch-Pagan LM test 
both estimates are consistent but the RE model involves more efficient 
estimates. However, other panel data studies involving Tobin’s q recommended 
the use of dynamic models – see Hayashi and Inoue (1991) or Blundell, Bond, 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992) – and, consequently, we also provide 
estimates for the model including the first lag of Tobin’s q as an additional 
explanatory variable (column 3). The Arellano-Bond tests of first and second 
order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals (m1 and m2, respectively) give 
evidence in favour of the absence of misspecification when using the simplest 
dynamic structure. Such a model is estimated by the GMM-2SLS Arellano-
Bond dynamic panel data estimator and for this specification the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions was also computed confirming the validity of the 
instruments. Regarding the parameter estimates, the results of both the static and 




dynamic specifications are quite similar, but the significance of the parameters 
obtained by the GMM-2SLS seems to increase due to the incorporation of a 
dynamic structure, which eliminates possible autocorrelation in the disturbances.   
All these results support the need to observe new corporate governance practices 
in order to increase firm’s value. Firms complying with the Olivencia code 
requirements (APLICGC), reporting unqualified audit reports (AUDI), 
providing a high director’s remuneration (REMDIR), and smaller size (LSIZE) 
have had their value increased in the last few years. Reporting a firm’s directors’ 
remuneration (TRANS) is expected to be welcome by the stock market, 
although this effect is not clearly significant.  
One of the most significant variables in the study is APLICGC, which is positive 
and highly significantly related to firm’s value. Nevertheless the dummy 
variable capturing whether the firm complied with the Olivencia code or not 
(GOV) reflects a negative and significant relation to firm’s (non-detected by 
Olcese, Gascó, Martínez-Pardo, Bonet and Gómez-Ansón, 2004). This finding 
implies a change in both the slope and the constant when describing the 
relationship between Tobin’s q and the degree of compliance with the code. The 
impact of the variable on Tobin’s q is captured by the APLICGC’s slope and the 
negative value for GOV’s parameter is required to improve data fit quality. In 
other words, it is the degree of compliance, rather than the mere publication of 
whether firms comply, which increases firm’s value;  and it happens despite the 
fact that the CNMV has not yet been able to control for the veracity of the 
communications about Olivencia code compliance. It seems that for the Spanish 
case, results do not corroborate Weir and Lang’s (2001) results when they 
conclude that a strict compliance with CGC does not lead to improvements in 
firm’s performance. 
With respect to the other 4 hypotheses considered, the hypotheses two, four and 
five are confirmed by our results. In particular, AUDI is clearly positive and 
significant, which agrees with the results obtained by Drobetz, Shilfhofer and 
Zimmermann (2003) for the German market and represents very hopeful news 
after results obtained by Del Brío (1998) or Cabal (2000) concluding that the 
Spanish market reacts similarly to both qualified and unqualified audit reports. 
On the other hand, Tobin’s q reacts negatively to LSIZE, but taking into account 
that among the 50 firms in our sample we find most of the biggest Spanish 
firms, this negative relationship indicates that the firms whose value has 
especially increased in the last years are the smallest among the biggest ones. 
The positive and  significant effect of director’s compensation on a firm’s value 
is detected on the dynamic GMM regression because this estimation seem to be 
more efficient as we have already commented. Finally, the least significant 
variable is the dummy variable TRANS, that is, the fact that a firm reports its 




directors’ remuneration or not. The significance of this variable is weak, since 
the smaller p-value (obtained in the dynamic model) is 0.133. 
7. CONCLUSIONS. 
Previous studies have cast doubts on the effectiveness of the application of good 
corporate governance codes in European countries, since sometimes they 
provoke new inefficiencies owing to the lack of suitability of Anglo-Saxon 
orientated codes to Continental-European firms. For this reason, the current 
paper analyses the degree of compliance of Spanish firms with the Olivencia 
code (Spain being a Continental-European country with an Anglo-Saxon 
orientated CGC) and analyse which of its recommendations have positive effects 
on a firm’s value. Furthermore, we contribute to the investigation on corporate 
governance by using the panel data methodology to measure the relationship 
between a firm’s value and the degree of compliance with 22 Olivencia Code 
recommendations as well as other corporate governance related variables 
(auditing, directors remuneration, transparency and firm’ size). Among the 22 
Olivencia code recommendations, the most relevant aspects are transparency 
and the quality of the audit report, relationships that are partly corroborated by a 
multivariate analysis and the panel data estimates. In fact, the results suggest a 
positive relationship between the variables of execution of good corporate 
governance practices and the value of the firm. They also provide evidence on 
the fact that a firm’s value increases as long as the audit reports receive 
favourable opinions, the higher the managers’ compensation, the smaller the 
firm size and the more transparent the firm is.  
The results of this research support the capability of the good corporate 
governance practices proposed by the CNMV to ensure better managerial results 
for the Spanish companies, despite their Anglo-Saxon orientation. The execution 
of these recommendations by Spanish firms leads to greater trust on the part of 
investors in stock markets and corporate governance, which is welcome after the 
increasing atmosphere of insecurity created after Enron and other firms 
collapsed. In our point of view, Spanish companies will continue to make 
headway in the adoption of practices pursuing improvement in the shareholder-
manager relationship, since it may bring more wealth to shareholders as well as 
greater security and stability for executives. 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF FIRMS BY SECTOR 
 
 





OTHER SERVICES 10 20.0 20.0 
CONSTRUCTION 8 16.0 36.0 
CAPITAL ASSETS 9 18.0 54.0 
INDUSTRIES OF 
TRANSFORMATION 10 20.0 74.0 
TRANSPORTS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 3 6.0 80.0 
ENERGY 3 6.0 86.0 
FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 7 14.0 100.0 
TOTAL 50 100  
 











   
22  371 
10  366 
19 * 366 
6 * 358 
9  353 
1  348 
18 344 
14  340 
4  339 
2  338 
20 * 336 
16 * 334 
3  332 
21  324 
17  323 
12  303 
5 * 298 
15  288 
11  282 
8  250 
13  219 
7  200 
Data on compliance of each recommendation for 187 revised questionnaires. Column 1 shows the number of the 
recommendation ordered by its hierarchical position; Column 2 displays the sum of the weights attached to each 
recommendation: we assigned a value of 0, 1 or 2 to each recommendation, considering whether the firm has 
total compliance (2), partial compliance (1) or non-compliance (0). The maximum value that a recommendation 
can obtain is 374 (187 firms multiplied by 2- total compliance value-). 












TABLE 3: FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS.  
 





SUM OF SQUARED SATURATIONS 
FROM THE EXTRACTION COMPONENTS 




1 5.145 23.388 23.388 
2 2.756 12.527 35.914 
3 1.742 7.920 43.834 
4 1.705 7.750 51.585 




TABLE 4: DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS RESULTS. 
 
INCLUDED/DROPPED VARIABLES A,B,C 
 
WILKS’ LAMBDA 













D.F. 2 D.F. 3 
1 REC 19 0.942 1 1 113.000 6.943 1 113.00
0 
0.010 
2 REC 20 0.876 2 1 113.000 7.922 2 112.00
0 
0.001 
3 REC 6 0.802 3 1 113.000 9.160 3 111.00
0 
0.000 
4 REC 5 0.766 4 1 113.000 8.328 4 110.00
0 
0.000 
5 REC 16 0.728 5 1 113.000 8.145 5 109.00
0 
0.000 
FunctionTest   WILKS’ LAMBDA     CHI-squared            d.f.           p-value 
            1                  0.728                       35.080                    5                0.000 
At each step, the variable minimising the global Wilks’ Lamba is included.  
A Maximum number of steps is 44 
B Minimum partial F to enter is 3.84  
C Maximum partial F to drop is 2.71 
REC stands for recommendation; D.F. stands for degrees of freedom 
 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN MODEL (1). 
 
VARIABLE PROXY MEASUREMENT 
EXPECTED 
RELATIONSHIP
A firm’s value Q: Tobin’s q. Ratio of market value 
of outstanding shares 
Dependent 
variable. 




plus debt to book 




GOV: Measures if 
a firm accomplish 
or not the 
Olivencia’s Code  
Dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 
for the companies 
that fulfil the 
Olivencia Code and 
O for that do not fulfill








a firm complies 
with each of the 
22 
recommendations.
For each firm we 
cumulate the weights 
associated to each 
recommendation, 
considering the value 
of 0 for firms which 
do not apply the 
recommendation, 1 
for partial application 





AUDI: stands for 
the quality of a 
firm’s audit report. 
Dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 
for unqualified firms 









dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 
for firms reporting on 
managers’ 








by directors as 
emoluments. 






interests.   
LSIZE: 
Firm’size 






TABLE 6: PANEL DATA ESTIMATE. 
 
 






Q (-1)   0.5685092 
(23.72) 
GOV -0.1527422  -0.1814212  -0.4948696  




(-1.52) (-1.97) (-6.89) 




































F (49,294) 8.17 
[0.0000] 
  
HAUSMAN TEST  3.67 
[0.7215] 
 






M1        -1.52 
[0.1273] 
M2   0.62 
[0.5371] 
SARGAN   10.81(14) 
[0.7012] 
T Statistics in parentheses and P-values in brackets





FIGURE 1: CUMULATE SCORE OBTAINED BY SAMPLE FIRMS IN 


















The white area represents the mean level of compliance of Spanish firms with the 22 recommendations of the 
Olivencia Code. The maximum mean value a firm can obtain is 44 (22 recommendations multiplied by 2 for 
total compliance). The black area represents the number of firms which obtained that level of compliance for the 




                                                 
1 An English version of these recommendations may be downloaded from the CNMV 
website. 
2 We do not include recommendation 23 into the analysis since it refers to the obligation of 
the firm to report its compliance with the CGC to the CNMV. All the firms in our sample 
have so reported to the CNMV at least one year in our sample period. 
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